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Justice

The article by Gilbert M. Cantor in The
Shingle for January 1962 entitled "The
Search for Justice in the Christian World,"
suggests that the precepts and counsels of
charity proclaimed by Christ were in some
way opposed to the virtue of justice. Mr.
Cantor poses the problem of "a public ambivalence" toward the bar and suggests
that one explanation of that ambivalence
"may be found in the teachings of Jesus."
He believes that "the Christian virtues of
humility-forgiveness, charity, abnegation
and self-denial-do not merely go beyond
the idea of justice: by clear implication
they reproach it."
John B. Gest counters in the March issue of The Shingle with an answer to Mr.
Cantor entitled "The Idea of Justice." According to Mr. Gest, in the treatment of
virtues by the Christian writers, justice and
charity are not in any sense incompatible.
Rather, justice is enriched and ennobled
by charity or love.
The idea of justice as an objective goal,
rendering to every man his due, involves,
of course, the antecedent and undetermined
concept of "due." The "due" is that to
which a man has a right. Rights, therefore,
must exist before the act of justice. The
recognition of these rights and their determination and protection, as far as humanly.'
possible, is the prime functon of government in Christian political philosophy.

Notable in considering the position of
justice in current Christian thought are the
Papal encyclicals on "Social Justice," particularly "Rerum Novarum" (On the Condition of Labor) by Pope Leo XIII;
"Quadragesimo Anno" (Reconstructing
the Social Order) by Pope Pius XI; and
recently "Mater et Magistra" by the present Pope, John- XXIII. In the first, the
Pope "grieving for the misery and wretchedness pressing unjustly on such a large
portion of mankind, boldly took in his own
hands the cause of workingmen, surrendered, isolated and helpless. . . ." The
principles of social justice which he announced were developed and applied in
the later encyclicals and extended to the
increasingly complex fields of capital and
labor relations and domestic and international relations in the social and economic
order.
Justice as a virtue, rendering to each his
due, is, with prudence, temperance and
fortitude, one of the cardinal virtues, so
called because the other moral virtues depend upon them as on a hinge (cardo).
What, then, is the relationship between
justice and charity (or love) in the Christian culture? Other theological virtuesfaith, hope and charity-motivate actions
and enrich and elevate them-"and the
greatest of these is charity." Charity in
this context means the virtue of love, love
of God for His own sake and love of
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man. as a creature of God. "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with thy whole
heart . . . and thy neighbor as thyself."
Mr. Gest suggests that the answer to
the downgrading of the idea of justice in
the modern mind, as observed by Mr. Cantor, is rather in the failure to retain the
ideal of justice inherent in the Christian
tradition. In the formative period of our
nation its influence was strong and its
concommitant political philosophy, that of
inalienable natural rights, was said by Jefferson to be an expression of the prevailing view. It was certainly the philosophy
fundamental in the writings of Burke, Wilson, Adams, Hamilton, Otis and other
writers of the 18th and 19th centuries.
But the late 19th and 20th centuries
have seen the growth of the skeptical and
positivist attack on these principles. The
question "what is truth" has been largely
displaced by questioning the objective reality of truth itself. A subjective approach
has become popular with the intellectual
"smart set" under which truth is fashioned by the thinker rather than the reverse. And, of course, the idea of justice
takes the same course, for justice is
founded on truth. The idea of human
law has become separate from the trad'tional higher law written on the heart of
man. Objective values of human rights
have been replaced by emotional values,
and law and justice, under the prevailing
secularist view, can only rest on the uncontrolled will of a majority that can override human rights.
Secularism and materialism have permeated the modern mind and with it the
legal profession itself. That is the real answer to the downgrading of the idea of justice and the public ambivalence to the bar.
The criticism should not be of Christian

culture, but rather of the rejection by the
modern mind of the fundamental idea of
law and justice, founded on the view that
man is a creature endowed by his Creator
with inalienable rights, for the protection
of which governments are instituted among
men. This was the foundation of political
philosophy prevailing in the formative period of our nation, and even up to recent
times. It was certainly based on principles then and now sustained by the Christian tradition, principles that are attainable by the use of reason by men of all
cultures.
Mr. Gest concludes by submitting that
it is the modern intellectual iconoclasts who
would dislodge justice from its foundation
and rob the legal profession of its idealnot Christian culture.
Mater Et Magistra
The Autumn '61 issue of The Catholic
Lawyer contained a splendid analysis by
Father Cronin of the encyclical "Mater et
Magistra." The March issue of Social Order contains another analysis by a sociologist, Father Herv6 Carrier, S.J., secretary
of the Institute of Social Sciences of the
Gregorian University, Rome. The article
first appeared in a symposium in a sister
review, Relations of Montreal, and was
translated by William B. Neenan, S.J., of
St. Mary's College, Kansas.
In this latest article on the encyclical,
Father Carrier explains that the economic
progress of the modern world and its
greater solidarity put in stark relief the
inequalities which exist at all levels. The
encyclical returns constantly to the theme
of imbalance. This theme, with solidarity,
is the key concept for describing the contemporary scene. Individuals, groups, regions, economic sectors, nations are each
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presented with their contrasts, disparities,
inequalities; in a word, with their socioeconomic imbalances, causes of multiple
injustices.
First of all, it is a fact that in a number
of countries and even "on entire continents" masses of workers and their families are reduced to "subhuman conditions."
Often the contrast between the luxury of
the privileged and the misery of the multitudes is "glaring and outrageous." In other
countries, under the banner of "an ill-conceived national prestige" or out of a desire
for an unreasonable economic growth, the
present generation is restricted by inhuman privations or large portions of the
national income are spent on arms.
Even in developed countries, the benefits
enjoyed by certain citizens are out of line
with their taxes and "disproportionate to
their contribution to the common good."
These imbalances are the reflection of a
fundamental inequality between social
progress and economic development. They
are the sign of "profound errors" concerning the goals, structure, and functioning of
the economy. "The economic and social
imbalances which violate justice and humanity are numerous in our day."
Private property presents other problems: the economic security of the individual has been separated from his possession of private property. Due to the establishment of rights in employment, people frequently base their security on their
skills rather than on "rights founded on
capital." According to the encyclical, "men
strive to acquire a competence that will
earn a salary for them rather than to become owners of property." Thus there has
developed a popular doubt concerning even
the right to private property. It is in this
sociological context that the encyclical em-
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phatically reaffirms the principles of the
right to private property, including the
ownership of productive goods.
The encyclical deals extensively with
two particularly acute contemporary problems, the inferior position in which farmers almost universally find themselves, and
the struggles facing the underdeveloped
countries.
The farm problem is a "fundamental
question" for every nation. How can the
"disproportion in productive efficiency"
between the agricultural sector and the industrial and service sectors be reduced?
How can the gap between urban and rural living standards be closed? How can
"an inferiority complex" in the farm population be prevented? Our age is characterized by such inequality; "the agricultural sector is nearly everywhere a depressed sector," underdeveloped, and
poorly equipped relative to other sectors.
This imbalance is due to poor economic
coordination and unequal chances for development. Agricultural income is accumulated more slowly. The risks are greater.
In addition, those who possess capital have
little inclination to invest in agriculture.
These serious inequalities call for a bold
political program of support, coordination,
and modernization. The encyclical emphasizes this point at length. It also insists
that the farmers themselves be active in
their own behalf. Association here, as also
in other sectors, is of "vital necessity."
These socio-economic imbalances exist
not only between sectors of production but
they can also be found in various regions
within nations. Some regions are prosperous; others are "economically backward."
This situation demands a common, effective effort by private enterprise and public
authority.
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Father Carrier observes further that the
striking imbalance between countries in
various stages of development is the most
pressing social preoccupation of our day.
Some countries "enjoy a high standard of
living" while others "suffer from extreme
poverty" and their citizens experience such
domestic problems that they are all but
overcome by poverty and hunger and are
not able to enjoy basic human rights.
These differences in economic development become even more urgent if we also
consider the increasing importance of the
population problem. The problem stems
from the imbalance between the means of
subsistence and population. The encyclical
devotes considerable attention to this problem and indicates that its only solution lies
in consciously developed world-wide cooperation.
This pressing problem involves the collective responsibility of all peoples. The
peace of all nations is at stake. "It is impossible to preserve a lasting and beneficial
peace while glaring socio-ecofiomic inequalities persist among them."
Emergency aid is indispensable; but this
aid must be complemented by an attack on
the roots of the imbalance. "These derive
above all from the primitive or backward
nature of an economy."
The Holy Father is not satisfied with a
mere statement of facts; he incisively points
up the obligations facing the modern conscience as well as the dangers and temptations which threaten the wealthy countries
in their dealings with poor countries. There
is the temptation to push for economic development without also promoting harmonious social progress. There is the more
subtle temptation to "impose their own
way of life while aiding such countries."
And there is the omnipresent temptation

for a nation to seek its own interest "in a
spirit of domination" which would be "a
new form of colonialism." But "the most
insidious snare" would be to give to these
countries an exclusively material well-being which would threaten the moral fiber
of the aided people.
The commentator concludes by stating
that the anomalies, inequalities and injustices of our day have their roots in the
more profound disorder of moral judgment
itself. We can see this disorder in "social
relations," truncated ideologies and the
illusion that the earthly city can be built
without religious foundations. "No folly
is more characteristic of the modern era
than the absurd attempt to reconstruct a
solid and prosperous temporal order while
prescinding from God. . . ." Despite admirable scientific progress humanity has
not shown an ability to develop spiritually;
in fact there seems to be an alarming spiritual regression. "Our age is characterized
by the contrast between prodigious scientific and technical progress and an alarming regression of humanity."
In spite of its frankness and undisguised
realism the Holy Father's description of
the present world scene does not convey
any notion of nostalgia, pessimism or dejection. The Church gladly accepts the
world as it exists while unsparingly and
with candor indicating its errors and aberrations. But, above all, Christians cherish
a lively hope of establishing a common life
"in truth, justice and love."
Civil Rights
Vice Dean Thomas O'Toole of Villanova Law School adds to his status as a
Constitutional Law authority with his brilliant review of Konvitz' "A Century of
Civil Rights," in the February issue of
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Social Order. Dean O'Toole points out that
the liveliest corpse on the American legal
scene is the doctrine of "separate but
equal." Plessy v. Ferguson has been killed
in the law books but it continues to express the reality of life not only South of
the Mason-Dixon Line but, all too often,
in the North as well. These are disappointing realities when one considers that seven
years have passed since the Supreme Court
mandated an end to segregation. This disappointment can become only deep and
bitter when attention is called to the fact
that we are nearing the centennial of the
emancipation of the Negro slaves.
The review stresses the fact that it is
against this longer perspective that Konvitz
assesses the development of civil rights
for the freedman. In a most interesting
opening chapter he shows how the question
of slavery became subordinated to the
question of race, so that the abolition of
slavery was not effective in securing civil
equality *for the man of color. Unlike other
civilizations which had condoned slavery,
the white Southern society knew the condition of being a slave as befalling only
colored persons and readily concluded that
to be colored was incompatible with being
free. Thus, the slavery question became
a race question, unsolved by executive or
constitutional emancipation.
. At the base of the problem was the
failure of slaveholders to view Negroes as being equal to the white man in moral and
spiritual dignity. This was tragically revealed in the attitude toward slave marriages and in the indifference towards preserving the integrity of slave families.
Konvitz is emphatic in declaring that the
root of the race problem is a failure of
moral judgment concerning the worth of
the Negro.
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In his outline of the legislative proposals
which began with emancipation and which
continue to our own day, Konvitz succeeds
in demonstrating that we are still hearing
the same objections to desegregation which
were voiced a century ago. This narrative
provides a telling answer to those who
would have us believe that racial equality
will come about through mere lapse of
time. The debate over the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 is re-enacted, almost in the same
terms, whenever the Senate considers a
civil rights proposal today.
Konvitz is thoroughly at home in his
materials, and traces each of the legislative
and judicial steps which brought us to our
present position. Of greatest importance
is his analysis of the emergence of the concept of "state action," limiting Congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. Harlan's dissent against this doctrine still rings with a moral fervor and
sense of indignation, best summarized in
his declaration that the Supreme Court was
now refusing to protect the personal rights
of freedom the way the property rights of
slaveowners had formerly been protected.
Harlan saw the moral issue clearly and expressed it in the famous dictum that our
Constitution is color-blind.
Though strong on the history of civil
rights legislation, Konvitz deals very inadequately with the present problems. Perhaps he deliberately put these beyond the
main scope of his work. In any event, a
couple of curious failures require comment. It is becoming increasingly apparent
that the Supreme Court made a serious
error in approving pupil placement laws
when these laws are part of a pattern of
hostility to racial integration. Konvitz does
not mention this development by which
the South appears to have shaped a tech-
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niquc for insuring that integration will not
progress beyond the token stage. t is a
courageous Negro who will face the placement process with its delays and its pitfalls.
Even if he is successful, he may well find
that the process has consumed a couple of
years in his educational career. The recalcitrant community can thus preserve itself from genuine integration and keep the
vast majority of the Negroes in their freedman status.
According to Dean O'Toole, in an attempt to deal with the question of "state
action," Konvitz suggests that this concept
is sufficiently broad to prohibit police action against those who seek racial equality
at lunch counters, in theaters and at other
places of public accommodation. He advances this argument on the basis of the
decisions prohibiting specific enforcement
of restrictive covenants in real estate deeds.
The argument is at best dubious and certainly threatens to expand the notion of
"state action" so broadly as to destroy its
meaning. Perhaps the time has come when
the Supreme Court should reconsider the
position taken in the Civil Rights Cases of

1883. Harlan's powerful dissent in that
case has lost none of its persuasiveness,
and the majority's decision seems as ripe
for rejection as was Plessy v. Ferguson

seven years ago.
Zoning

The overwhelming weight of judicial authority in the United States is that the complete exclusion of churches, colleges, universities, parochial schools and academic
private schools from residence districts by
zoning regulations is ultra vires and, consequently, is an invalid exercise of delegated police power. Especially is this so
where other nonresidential uses are per-

mitted by zoning ordinance in such districts. There is a plethora of decisions to
this effect in the highest courts of various
states.
The February 26-27 issues of The New
York Law Journal feature a two part article by Ralph Crolly and Arden H. Rathkopf which analyzes this whole area of
law, particularly from the point of view
of New York.'
In treating the zoning of churches, the
article states in part that apparently the
determination of whether these uses may
be validly excluded from residence districts, and to what extent, is to be made by
the highest courts of the individual states.
The Supreme Court of the United States
has not ruled upon the question. In the
landmark case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' the Court specifically
omitted from its consideration the validity of zoning ordinances excluding such
uses from residence districts of municipalities, and since then has apparently not
passed on this issue. In Corporation of
Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterfield'
the issue of the validity of such exclusion
was specifically presented on an appeal
from the decision of the highest court in
California, which upheld such exclusion.
The appeal, however, was dismissed for
want of a substantial federal question.
The Latter Day Saints case, therefore, is ample authority for the position
that the exclusion of churches from a particular residence district does not in-

1 For

a more comprehensive study of the cases

in this area see Note, The Effect of Zoning Ordinances on Churches, 7 CATHOLIC LAWYER 151

(1961).
2272 U.S. 365 (1926).
3338

U.S. 805 (1949).
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volve the question of prohibition of the
free exercise of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution. If local decisional law is that
churches are subject to zoning ordinances
in the same manner and to the same extent
as other uses, and may validly be prohibited from a particular district if their inclusion would not be compatible with the
comprehensive plan or otherwise reasonable, no constitutional rights are infringed.
Private academic schools are those which
are subject to a modicum of state supervision, which have curricula similar to that
current in public schools and which comply with the state's compulsory educational
requirements.
With respect to the zoning of schools,
public schools, which are in New York
constitutionally mandated, have always
been exempt from local zoning ordinances
on the ground that the state has delegated
to boards of education and to the commissioner of education authority to regulate
and control them, thus pre-empting to such
boards and state official the entire field of
activity of the school, which necessarily
precludes a municipality from the exercise of local regulation and control of such
use.
Private schools, even though nonprofit
and though having curricula equivalent to
that of public schools, are not on the same
plane, since they are not similarly regulated by local boards of education or directly to be considered to be an arm of the
state and, unlike public schools, they need
not serve a community without discrimination.
While parents have the basic constitutional right to have their children educated
in schools of their own choice, subject to
reasonable regulations as to the subjects
required to be taught, the manner and pe-
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riod of' time of instruction," this does not
mean that private schools are as to location immune from the application of municipal zoning ordinances. Consequently,
in Great Neck Community Schools v. Dick'
the lower court held that the latter constituted a valid basis for denying the village
the power to control by zoning regulations
the state's school system, leaving the village the power to set aside areas by zoning
regulations in which private schools were
not permitted. The ordinance in that case,
which excluded private schools from certain areas in which public schools were,
perforce, permitted, was stated to be valid.
Later cases in New York, however, put
nonprofit private academic schools, which,
in all except their ownership, were equivalent to public schools, on the same basis
in so far as zoning regulations were concerned. In the process, however, of equating public schools and private schools of
the character discussed, the basis upon
which exclusionary provisions were held
to be invalid was changed. The original
basis, as above indicated, was that, with
respect to public schools, local municipalities could not so act as to thwart the policy of the state. Obviously, such basis of
decision did not lie with private schools,
no matter how closely parallel their activities might be to public schools. The
reason for invalidating such ordinances
with respect to private schools was, consequently, placed upon the same basis
as the reason for invalidating ordinances
which attempted to exclude churches from
residence districts. Churches, irrespective
of their denomination, are held as a matPierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
5 140 N.Y.S.2d 221 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd, 3
App. Div. 2d 664, 158 N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't
1957).
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ter of law and state policy to promote and
support the public health, safety, morals
and general welfare of the community.
Since zoning ordinances may exclude uses
only when such exclusion is necessary for
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, there is an obvious contradiction in an
attempt to exclude churches and churchconducted schools, which are really accessory uses to churches, on these grounds.
The same rule applies to colleges and
universities. Such an exclusion is, consequently, arbitrary, unreasonable, and an
ultra vires attempt at exercise of the delegated police power.
However, the article concludes that a
municipality's fire, health and safety regulations, as far as reasonable and applicable,
may be enforced as to buildings or structures in residence districts used for church,
college, university, parochial, and such nonprofit private school purposes, regardless
of zoning, and the right to use such property is subject to the issuance of required
certificates of occupancy showing compliance with such regulations. It is just as
essential to public health, safety and welfare to see that such uses are properly located as to see that they comply with fire,
health and safety regulations and with
area, height, bulk and yard requirements.
Another article dealing with church zoning appears in the February issue of the
Hastings Law Journal. It summarizes the
California decisions on the subject as follows:
(1) Excluding all churches and schools
is non-discriminatory under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
(2) Houses of worship must be considered equally with other land uses in the
planning of residential communities.

(3) The courts will seldom interfere
with a zoning ordinance based upon public welfare.
(4) All of the decisions directly affecting churches were handed down by an intermediate court. Neither the California
nor United States Supreme Court has directly passed upon the constitutionality of
an ordinance which wholly excludes
churches from specified districts. The fact
that these courts have declined to review
these causes does not imply a negative view
upon the merits.
(5) The California ruling is a minority view, having been followed only in Florida. The majority of states, as stated
earlier, have determined that the absolute
exclusion of churches does not adequately
promote the general welfare in order to
justify any qualification of the first amendment.
In conclusion, the article argues that the
distinction between the California view and
the majority view appears to be in the definition of general welfare. The majority
view emphasizes traditional humanistic
values. It contends that different considerations are involved in any regulation
when the user of the land is a church. The
California position emphasizes the best and
most reasonable utilization of land possible
and holds that a church must fit into a
comprehensive zoning plan as would any
other property owner.
Reasonable minds may differ as to the
more desirable view. Some argue the physical undesirabilities of churches outweigh
the social value; others, that absolute freedom of religion as affecting the character
of the individual is of greater importance
than empirical values.
If the public laws are to be used to bar
churches from specified areas, certain
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groups of citizens could conceivably control the practice of religion in widespread
areas. Whole towns could successfully bar
churches from within their limits. These
abuses are fortunately theoretical, but legally possible under California's present
decisions.
To prevent such possible abuses and to
clarify the law, it would be desirable for
the legislature to make more definite its
intent to regulate land use for church purposes. The wisdom of this decision should
not be left to judicial review, on a case to
case basis.
Sociological Jurisprudence
The current Winter issue of the Villanova Law Review contains an excellent critique of sociological jurisprudence by
James A. Gardner. Mr. Gardner believes
that Dean Pound has been much influenced by the Neo-Hegelians, both in his
approach to legal problems and in his
studies in legal history and philosophy.
This has been particularly true in more
recent years. It renders his entire work suspect where classification and interpretation
on a broad scale are involved, and this has
been Pound's particular hobby for many
years. In connection with his theory of
interests, Pound has shown the manifestations of a system-builder, with an idealistic
teleological axiology. While denying values per se, he has inevitably been forced to
adopt values, as for example Kohler's conception of civilization (which is Neo-Hegelian), and in the formulation of the jural
postulates and the scheme of social interests. He has constantly interpreted history
as a continually widening process of becoming. While he does not claim this to
be inevitable, in the context of his notions
of civilization, one feels that it is. More-
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over, as the years have gone by, Pound
has gradually shifted his emphasis from
the study of what the courts do in fact to
the study of jural ideals of the present
and past. In religion, Pound is a skeptic,
and he could well feel that by past experience and conviction he is wedded to a
relativistic view of the universe-but one
wonders if underneath he is not obsessed
by a desire for certainty and longing for
the absolutes of a universal and immutable
natural law. So much of Pound's writing
seems to reflect this longing for the natural
law ideal his jural postulates belong to
the ultimate ideals of the age, his conviction that the ethical ideal is the prime motivating factor in the behavior of judges,
his recent tendency to ignore the factual
setting in which events have taken place
and to select the ideological as the motivating factor, his conviction that "higher
ideals" will prevail-that one wonders if
his ideal of justice and his whole theory of
interests is not really anchored in natural
law and more specifically in Neo-Hegelian
idealism. While Pound claims to be a
pragmatist and has repeatedly affirmed this
position, Professor Cohen states that as a
logician and especially as a legal historian,
"he is decidedly Neo-Hegelian, showing
markedly the influence of Kohler in emphasizing the ideological factor." The question then becomes this: What difference
does it make? The answer is that it affects
Pound's objectivity. A large part of the
philosophical world rejects the Hegelian
viewpoint and holds that it has grave defects as a system and that "system-building"
in general has repeatedly been proven to
be worthless by reason of the invalidity of
some major premise. Such thinkers approach the study of Pound's writings where
interpretation and classification are in-

IN OTHER PUBLICATIONS

volved with grave skepticism. When patent defects appear, they reject it. As a
pragmatist, Pound would say that no system is perfect-the question is whether it
will work. But even applying this test,
there are simpler ways which will work
as well if not better.
Pound's choice of pragmatism as an
ethical theory has been criticized from several viewpoints. The scholastic objection
is that the theory denies absolute values
and makes the sense of mankind, for the
time being, the highest measure of the legal
order. This is a basic objection, but it attacks Pound from the position of a different philosophical value system. Different
major premises being assumed, the issue is
joined on a level where it can never be resolved, though for practical purposes Pound
may be found in the natural law camp.
A second objection is that the theory ignores the factor of individual justice and
subjects the entire society to the ephemeral
caprice of public opinion. While on a
purely mundane level Pound is much concerned about individual justice, in theory
he denies the validity of the problem. He
maintains that this involves subjective values, while the only reasonable test is that
of harmonizing claims. Mr. Gardner submits, however, that ethical notions in the
sense of ideas of right and wrong are important in the context of society even if no
absolute principles are involved, and that
the individual element in justice is an important factor, that no "felicific calculus"
is available which can reduce the matter
to a cut and dried scheme.
Mr. Gardner believes further that Dean
Pound has become too disturbed about the
uncertainties of the law in action and has
sought consolidation in the security of a
quasi-natural law system. While still ad-

hering to his earlier ethical values (pragmatism), he has adopted Neo-Hegelian
idealism to a considerable extent and has
devoted much of his prodigious energy to
the defense of his system. This fusion of
pragmatism .with Hegelianism has not been
an altogether happy union. Mr. Gardner
observes that this fusion has created certain
problems as to where Pound stands as a
philosopher and how consistent he remains.
Yet Pound has steadfastly maintained his
position against all criticisms. While Pound's
philosophy admits of a viewpoint that
does not assert immutability, nevertheless
for practical purposes it must be treated
as if it did. This puts Pound in a class
closely allied to fundamentalism, yet without the advantages of consistency which
the true fundamentalists maintain. As a
result, he receives more than his fair share
of criticism, some of it the result of a failure to understand what his position actually is. Nevertheless, his great legal studies
keep him at the head of our generation of
law reformers. If he had continued in the
wake of his early studies of law in society,
his position would be less controversial and
perhaps his contribution to jurisprudence
would have been even greater than it now
is.

In conclusion, Mr. Gardner emphasizes
that to point out weaknesses of abstract
Poundian theory is neither to deny the immense contribution of sociological jurisprudence to modern legal studies nor
Pound's leading part therein. This article
has concentrated on the theory of justice,
but it cannot be gainsaid that sociological
jurisprudence in general has been the mainspring of twentieth-century legal theory nor
that Dean Pound's insistence upon treating
law in the context of society as a living
organism and his great writings in this
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context have been among the outstanding
contributions of the century: In any subsequent examination of the jurisprudence
of our age, Pound's name must be writ
large. Thus, in spite of certain criticisms
of his theory of justice, Pound may be
said to be the founder and leading representative of a school of thought which will
remain a permanent part of jurisprudential theory and will continue to exert a
powerful and ameliorating influence upon
the law in action.
Mr. Justice Brennan
Much speculation has existed during the
past several years among legal philosophers
and moralists as to just what is involved
in the legal philosophy of Mr. Justice Brennan and just how this philosophy will be
expressed in decisions he makes as a member of the highest Court in the United
States. The January 1962 issue of The
Catholic University of America Law Review ambitiously attempts to analyze this
philosophy in three separate articles. The
most detailed of the three, entitled "The
Common Sense of Mr. Justice Brennan,"
is by William V. Shannon, head of the
Washington Bureau of the New York Post.
Mr. Shannon reasons that the distinguishing quality of Brennan's pattern of
thought is what may be called massive
common sense. His approach to every
case is practical, specific, factual. Unlike
Black or Frankfurter, he rarely lays down
sweeping dicta. He gives the impression
of reasoning inductively from the facts before him rather than deductively from his
own set of first principles. This, in turn,
accounts for the characteristic tone of his
opinions. While some of his colleagues
give the impression of writing for posterity
rather than any present audience, Brennan
invariably addresses himself to his breth-

CATHOLIC

LAWYER, SPRING

1962

ren on the Court and his professional colleagues in the law. He is conciliatory and
moderate. His is the negotiator's manner;
one catches in his opinions the overtones
of the conference room mediator and the
earnest debater, seeking to persuade rather
than overpower. Those overtones are missing in the opinions of several of his colleagues. Brennan is neither prophet nor
professor nor publicist. His tone is that of
the practical man who, even when most
deeply convinced of the rightness of his
own position, does not wholly forget that
one or another of his colleagues who differs with him today may join with him
in making a different majority tomorrow.
This is not to suggest that there is anything
weakly placating or self-deprecatory in
Brennan's work; he has at his command a
resource of lucid, sturdy prose. But he foregoes the witticism, the epigram, the twisting personal thrust, if, indeed, these literary devices occur to him; and although he
occasionally rises to indignation, it is an
impersonal kind of indignation, and his
language is characteristically calm and
good-humored. One does not turn to
Brennan's opinions to enjoy their high
style, discursive erudition, or the working
out of an iron logic, but one does find in
them a body of reasonable argument reflecting a patient open-mindedness and a
decent, humane spirit.
He concludes by stating that Brennan
has demonstrated it is possible to achieve
libertarian results by weighing conflicting
interests rather than by erecting absolute
prohibitions. He has placed his main reliance upon the lessons of history, practical experience, the common sense derived
from common experience. This is an appealing attitude for a man to have whose
task is to interpret the present-day mean-
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ing of the oldest written Constitution in
the world still in use. Moreover, it places
Brennan in our nation's central tradition
because we Americans are a covenanted
people, the people of the Mayflower Compact and the Constitution, always harking
back to first principles, but we are also a
people of pragmatic temper, a people of
Yankee inventors, western pioneers, and
enterprising immigrants.
Given Brennan's libertarian temper but
open-minded, undogmatic position on the
theoretical issues, he could conceivably
serve as a bridging influence within the
Court between the absolutist defenders of
liberty and the sometimes unrestrained advocates of self-restraint. Although that
has not proved true in these first five years,
his common-sense approach may provide
Mr. Justice Brennan with increasing opportunities over the long reach of his future career to play a unique and useful role
in reconciling the divergent intellectual
viewpoints for which his colleagues now
contend.
In a short companion article entitled
"Mr. Justice Brennan After Five Years,"
Professor Daniel Berman observes that it
is still too early to predict whether Brennan will always content himself with employing essentially conservative judicial
formulas to achieve liberal results, or
whether he will eventually choose to make
a more lasting contribution to constitutional law. If the past is any indication,
he will not lack for heavy-handed advice as
he struggles with the intellectual dilemmas
that will confront him in the years to come,
and after he makes his choices there will
be an overabundance of intensely personal
criticism. But he will never be swayed, except by the logic of an argument.
Not that denunciation does not disturb

him. He was deeply troubled at the time
of his nomination to the Supreme Court
when he was attacked by McCarthyites
(who considered him soft on Communism), by bigots (who could not abide the
thought of a Catholic on the Court), and
even by some Catholics (who were startled by the categorical assurance he had
given the Senate Judiciary Committee that
"there isn't any obligation of our faith superior to [the oath of office]." And the
sum total of this criticism was negligible
compared with the abuse that was heaped
upon him after his opinions in Jencks and
duPont-and especially after it became
clear to some Cantabrigians that he was
not a Frankfurter man even though he had
studied at Harvard Law School.
The last of the series by Lawrence Speiser focuses on the specific area of the Bill
of Rights and Mr. Justice Brennan. According to Mr. Speiser, although Brennan
does not adhere to the absolutist view of
the first amendment, he will not permit the
freedoms of speech, press or religion to be
infringed on the basis of mere legislative
preferences. These freedoms he considers
the very matrix of our society. If there is a
choice to be made, he tends to protect first
amendment freedom by some procedural
due process ruling. He is deeply conscious
of the tragic brandings with the "badge of
infamy" that have been committed in the
name of "national security." He has sublime faith in the ability of traditional procedural due process to prevent injustices
in the name of national security.
Mr. Speiser asks how history will assess
Mr. Justice Brennan. His answer is that it
is still far too early to tell. But that he will
be considered a "liberal" member of the
Court, there can be no doubt. The stream
of 5-to-4 decisions emanating from the
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Supreme Court and apparently fluctuating
with the heat of the Cold War has found
him firmly beside the Chief Justice and
Justices Black and Douglas. At a time
when many liberals were willing to balance
the public's interest in national security
against the individual's interest in free expression and procedural rights, Brennan
has refused to be panicked from the position that protection for the rights of individuals is not incompatible with protection
of the country.
Business Ethics
Lawyers who practice primarily in the
area of commercial law will be extremely
interested in an article appearing in the
published proceedings of the Sixteenth
Annual Convention of The Catholic Theological Society of America. Entitled
"Moral Problems in Business Practice," it
is an excellent treatment of a subject on
which there is a noticeable lack of literature.
With respect to taxes, the author, Father
Daniel Lowery, C.SS.R., points out that
much printer's ink has been spilled over
the moral obligation of paying just taxes.
But the question still comes up frequently
in serious conversation with businessmen.
In the United States two opinions regarding the payment of taxes seem to be
quoted most frequently. Two theologians,
Henry Davis, S.J., and Francis Connell,
C.SS.R., are quoted often enough as proponents of the two schools of thought.
Father Davis is usually cited as. a proponent of the penal law theory in regard to
taxation. He clearly holds that "in England the obligation is certainly penal only."
He says further: "In most states nowadays,
and prescinding from periods of urgent
need and imminent danger, it is questionable whether this obligation is more than
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penal." Fr. Connell, while acknowledging
that some theologians uphold the penal
law theory, says that "the far more probable opinion" and the opinion "that should
be followed" is that the payment of taxes
binds in conscience, out of legal justice,
"so that it would be a grave sin to refuse
to pay a just tax bill for a sizable amount."
Fr. Connell then adds: ". . . it seems probable that one would not fail against this
virtue (legal justice) if he used strategem
to diminish his tax bill to some extent,
since the rates are based on the supposition that there will be some evasion on the
part of many."
It is clear that Fr. Davis and Fr. Connell are primarily concerned with justice
(and restitution) in their treatment of this
question. But it should also be noted
that these men are conscious of the requirements of other moral virtues that may
be involved. Thus, Davis states:
Nevertheless, there is no possible excuse
for studied evasion of taxes, and therefore
though, post factum, it is not necessary to
urge restitution, ante factum, citizens
should be urged to pay their share of the
taxes. No countenance can be given to the
employment of fraud, deceit, or lying, in the
matter of income-tax returns. But such
acts are not clearly sins against justice and
do not necessarily entail restitutions; they
are usually sins against truthfulness and no
confessor can ever condone them under
any circumstances.
And Fr. Connell, having stated his opinion as given above, adds: "Needless to
say, this involves at least a falsehood, and
is surely not to be recommended."
Father Lowery thinks the point is important. If these opinions are not fully
explained, they give the impression that
these men are approving of (or at least not
disapproving of) deceit, lying, misrepresentation of facts, etc. This is untrue.

